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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In general, 2006 was a good year to be a defendant in environmental
cases that reached the Eleventh Circuit. The court placed a narrow
construction on operator liability for corporate parents under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”)1 and backed agency interpretations of the Clean Air
Act (“CAA”)2 regulations in the face of challenges to their interpreta-
tion3 and use.4 In an issue of first impression, the court held that the
agency’s failure to carry out a nondiscretionary duty under the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)5 constituted a one-time, and not a
continuing, violation for purposes of applying the statute of limitation.6
Conversely, in a case involving proposed limestone mining in wetlands
adjacent to both the Everglades National Park and the urban coast of
Florida, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida ruled for the plaintiffs, remanding an Environmental Impact
Statement (“EIS”)some eight years in the making due to inadequacies
under both the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)7 and the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”).8
* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of Law
(J.D., 1993).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); see Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI
Utils., Inc., 463 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
3. See Sierra Club v. Johnson, 436 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2006), with the exception of a
successful challenge to the adequacy of public notice in the case of one permit.
4. See Sierra Club v. Georgia Power, 443 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2006).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
6. Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
8. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); see Sierra Club v. Flowers, 423 F.
Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
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I. COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY ACT
In Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Utilities, Inc.,9 a case involving the
site of a former manufactured gas plant facility (“MGP”), the Eleventh
Circuit applied the United States v. Bestfoods10 corporate-parent
liability standard to determine whether a parent corporation alleged to
have acted as an operator of a facility was liable under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”).11 The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment as to defendants UGI Utilities (“UGI”) and CenterPoint Energy
Resources Corporation (“CenterPoint”), holding that defendants UGI and
CenterPoint were not liable as operators of the MGP because, even
though both companies were parents and played active roles in the
management of Atlanta Gas Light Company’s (“AGL”) predecessor-owner
of the MGP, neither conducted operations specifically related to the
leakage or disposal of hazardous waste.12 The court also held that
defendant Century Indemnity Company (“Century”) was not liable for
leakage under an insurance policy that provided coverage for “accidents”
because leakage from the MGP was routine and expected in the
industry, and AGL’s predecessor-owner was likely aware that such
leakage was occurring.13
MGP began operation in the late nineteenth century. The process
involved heating products such as coal or oil and producing gas. The
process also generated byproducts, including coal tar, which contained
hazardous substances and which, AGL contended, routinely leaked from
the MGP equipment. The MGP at issue in the case was located in St.
Augustine, Florida, and began operation in 1886. AGL’s predecessor, St.
Augustine Gas and Electric Company (“SAGE”), was incorporated in
1887 and owned the MGP through 1947.14
From 1887 to 1928, defendant UGI’s predecessor was a minority owner
of SAGE but also nominated most of the local superintendents for the
MGP, provided management and consulting services to SAGE, and
placed several of the officers and directors on SAGE’s board.15 In 1928
9. 463 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2006).
10. 524 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1998).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d
at 1204.
12. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1208.
13. Id. at 1209 & nn. 12-14.
14. Id. at 1202-03.
15. Id. at 1202-03, 1205.
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CenterPoint’s predecessor acquired the stock of SAGE and replaced
SAGE’s board with CenterPoint executives. From 1930 to 1935,
CenterPoint provided management and engineering services to SAGE.
Finally, from 1940 to 1947, Century’s predecessor provided liability
insurance to SAGE that covered liability due to “accidents.” AGL
contended that during all of these time periods, daily leaks occurred
from the MGP equipment.16 AGL, named as a responsible party at the
facility, settled with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and
sued the defendants for contribution under § 113 of CERCLA,17
contending that during the designated times, UGI’s and CenterPoint’s
predecessors had operated the MGP, and Century’s had provided
insurance coverage.18 The district court granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, holding that AGL had not produced enough
evidence to create an issue of fact that either UGI or CenterPoint had
operated the plant or that any leaks had actually occurred during the
time Century’s insurance coverage applied.19
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.20 First, as to the operator liability of
UGI and CenterPoint under CERCLA, the court applied the United
States Supreme Court’s test for the imposition of CERCLA operator
liability on a parent for a facility owned by its subsidiary set out in
Bestfoods.21 In Bestfoods the Court held that a plaintiff seeking to
impose liability must show that the parent “manage[d], direct[ed] or
conduct[ed] operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations
having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or
decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.”22
Following this standard, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that AGL
failed to show that either UGI or CenterPoint made operating decisions
regarding the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, as required under
16. Id. at 1203.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2000). Because AGL settled, UGI contended that the court did
not have jurisdiction over the case, citing the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, 543 U.S. 157, 165-171 (2004), where the Court held
that a party could not bring a contribution action under CERCLA § 113 unless the party
itself had been sued under CERCLA § 106 or § 107 (42 U.S.C. § 9606 or § 9607). UGI
argued that because AGL settled before litigation, AGL could not bring a CERCLA
contribution claim. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1203-04. The Eleventh Circuit held
that it did have jurisdiction, relying on dicta in the Cooper Industries opinion that CERCLA
§ 113(f)(3)(B) offered an avenue for contribution actions for parties that had settled
CERCLA claims with the United States. Id. at 1204.
18. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1202.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1210.
21. 524 U.S. 51, 67-68 (1998); Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1205.
22. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67).
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Bestfoods.23 Although UGI supervised the plant through centralized
committees, appointed plant superintendents, and maintained manage-
ment and consulting contracts with SAGE, the court concluded that none
of this involvement included work with hazardous waste leakage or
disposal.24 Similarly, CenterPoint placed its senior executives on the
board of SAGE and entered into a contract to manage SAGE,25 but the
court held that this evidence, without more, was insufficient to establish
operator liability.26 The court noted that under Bestfoods, interrelation-
ships between a corporate parent and subsidiary that are within
“corporate norms” cannot in and of themselves be the basis for CERCLA
operator liability without evidence that the parent actually participated
in decisions about hazardous waste at a facility.27 Furthermore, in
neither case did the management contracts actually involve the parent
in the day-to-day operations of the plant with regard to hazardous waste
leakage or disposal.28
Turning to AGL’s claim against Century, the liability insurer, the
court held that summary judgment in Century’s favor was also
proper.29 The insurance policies at issue provided coverage for “acci-
dents.”30 The court noted that by AGL’s own assertions, MGPs leaked
routinely and consistently.31 Further, uncontradicted evidence showed
that the MGP industry was aware of the leakage during the time periods
in question.32 The court noted that the burden was on AGL to produce
evidence tending to show that SAGE’s owners were unaware of ongoing
leakage that AGL asserted was occurring during this time; however,
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1205-06.
25. The court noted that while CenterPoint’s contracts with SAGE called for
“management” services, the contracts in fact did not contemplate operation of the plant
itself; one was for the provision of consulting engineering services and the other for
management advisory services, primarily financial. Id. at 1207. The court ruled that
neither of these contracts contemplated involvement in the day-to-day operation of the
plant, which distinguished this case from the court’s holding in Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1509-10 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding an apartment
complex management company liable as an operator of the complex under CERCLA due
to its involvement in the day-to-day-operations of the facility). See Atlanta Gas Light Co.,
463 F.3d at 1208 n.10.
26. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1208.
27. Id. at 1205-06.
28. Id. at 1205.
29. Id. at 1210.
30. Id. at 1208-09.
31. Id. at 1209.
32. Id.
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AGL failed to produce this evidence.33 For these reasons, the court held
that any leaks of byproduct of the MGP process during the time
Century’s insurance coverage was in place could not have been the result
of “accidents.”34
II. CLEAN AIR ACT
In Sierra Club v. Johnson,35 the Eleventh Circuit decided two
consolidated appeals of EPA decisions in failing to object to the Clean
Air Act (“CAA”)36 Title V operating permits issued by the Georgia
Environmental Protection Division (“EPD”), reversing the agency’s
decision in one appeal and affirming in the other.37 The first chal-
lenged permit involved the EPD’s failure to notify the public of the
permit application via a required mailing list. The second challenge
addressed the kind of compliance information made available to the
public during both the permitting process and facility operation.38
In the first case, the court reversed the EPA’s decision not to object to
the issuance of the permit.39 The court held that the EPA abused its
discretion in failing to object where the EPD had failed to notify the
public via a required mailing list until after the permit application had
been approved.40 CAA regulations clearly required the EPD to issue
notices via the mailing list, and the EPA had a clear statutory duty to
object to any permit that did not comply with the Act.41 Also, in a
threshold issue in the first case, the court held that the Sierra Club had
standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to object where one of its
members alleged that the EPD’s failure to follow the notice requirement
had a concrete, adverse affect on him, even though the member himself
had actual notice of the permit application.42
In the second case, the court affirmed the EPA’s refusal to object to
four permits issued by the EPD, holding that the EPA did not abuse its
discretion in failing to object where the permits required the permitted
facilities only to report monitoring results showing any deviation from
the permit requirements and not results showing permit compliance.43
33. Id. at 1209 n.12.
34. Id. at 1210.
35. 436 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2006).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
37. Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1284.
38. Id. at 1272.
39. Id. at 1280.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1279.
43. Id. at 1283.
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The court also held that the EPA did not abuse its discretion in failing
to object where the EPD did not make available to the public monitoring
data and other information that might be relevant to the permitting
process and was kept at the facilities themselves, but was not considered
by the EPD in the permitting process.44 On both these issues, the court
concluded that the EPA based its decision on reasonable interpretations
of its regulations, and the court deferred to the agency’s decisions.45
First, the court held that the EPA abused its discretion in failing to
object to a CAA operating permit issued to King Finishing Company for
its fabric printing and dyeing facility in Dover, Georgia, because the
EPD, the state permitting agency acting pursuant to its State Implemen-
tation Plan (“SIP”), failed to notify persons on its mailing list of the
permit application before approving the permit.46 The permitting
agency must provide notice and an opportunity to comment to the public
before acting on a CAA Title V permit application; notice must be given
by newspaper publication and also by notifying persons on a mailing list
that the EPA regulations require the agency to maintain.47 Following
state approval, the EPA reviews the permit and must object to the
permit if it violates any provision of the CAA. If the EPA fails to object,
any person may challenge the failure by petitioning the EPA.48
In the King Finishing permit process, the EPD did not create the
required mailing list until after the public comment period had expired.
The parties did not dispute that the EPD violated the mailing list
requirement. The petitioner, Sierra Club, had actual notice of the permit
application and submitted comments but requested that the EPD go
through the notice and comment process again to include the mailing.
The EPD declined, and after Sierra Club’s petition, the EPA declined to
object, reasoning that use of the mailing list would not have significantly
increased public participation, and further, that it was not required
under its regulations to object to procedural defects in the permitting
process but instead was only required to object to defects in the permit
itself.49
The court considered the EPA’s position under both the Chevron
standard of review applicable to a court’s review of an agency’s
44. Id. at 1284.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1280.
47. Id. at 1273. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 70.7 (2007) for notice requirements.
48. See Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1280.
49. Id. at 1279-80.
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interpretation of a statute50 and the Auer standard of review applicable
to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.51 The court
determined that in the CAA, Congress intended for the EPA to have a
nondiscretionary duty to object to a permit where the state permitting
agency had clearly violated a regulatory requirement in issuing the
permit.52 Further, the court held that the EPA could not avoid this
duty by a contrary interpretation of a regulation that the EPA itself
implemented.53
The court also determined that the Sierra Club had standing to
challenge the EPA’s failure to object to the King Finishing permit.54
The Sierra Club’s standing was based on the affidavit of one of its
members55 who lived near the King facility and alleged that the EPD’s
failure to notify via the mailing list possibly reduced the level of public
participation in the permitting process, thereby reducing the likelihood
that the permit would be more protective of health and the environment.
However, this member did not allege that he did not have actual notice
of the permit application in time to comment on it. The EPA contended
that a person complaining of a defect in notice regarding an agency
permitting decision only had standing to challenge the defect if he did
not receive actual notice.56
The court held that under the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,57 the member had standing because
the EPD’s violation of its procedural duty to notify via the mailing list
threatened the member’s concrete interest in his health, notwithstanding
the fact that he had actual notice of the permit application.58 The court
held that “[t]he [United States Supreme] Court’s analysis in Lujan
50. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984), a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers first
must decide as a threshold matter whether Congress has spoken directly to the question
at issue. Id. If so, the court gives effect to Congress’s intent, and no further inquiry is
necessary. Id.
51. Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1274. Under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997),
a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations defers to the agency
unless the interpretation is “ ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ ” See
Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
52. Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1280.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1279.
55. An organization such as the Sierra Club has standing to sue on behalf of its
members only if, among other things, the members would have standing in their own right.
Id. at 1276.
56. Id. at 1279.
57. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
58. Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1279.
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suggests that a procedural injury not personal to a plaintiff is enough to
confer standing if that injury is connected to a separate concrete interest
of the plaintiff ’s.”59 The court concluded that “a plaintiff has estab-
lished procedural injury standing if he has established that the claimed
violation of the procedural right caused a concrete injury in fact to an
interest of the plaintiff that the statute was designed to protect,”
regardless of whether the alleged procedural violation was specific to the
plaintiff or merely a violation of a procedural duty owed to the general
public.60 Based on this interpretation of standing, the court held that
the Sierra Club’s member, and therefore the Sierra Club, had standing
to challenge the EPA’s refusal to object to the King Finishing permit.61
The court reached this conclusion because the member had alleged a
general procedural violation—the EPD’s failure to notify via the mailing
list. This failure was connected to a threatened injury in fact to
him—the possibility that had the EPD complied with the notice
requirements, the notice would have received more comments on the
permit application, which could have resulted in stricter permit
requirements and thus done more to protect the environment where the
member lived.62 The fact that the member himself had notice and the
opportunity to comment was deemed irrelevant.63
Next, the court held that the EPA did not abuse its discretion in
failing to object to four permits issued by the EPD,64 including the King
Finishing permit, on the ground that the permits required the facilities
to report to the EPD only incidents of noncompliance, not all monitoring
data.65 The regulation at issue, which was incorporated into the
permits, required that reports of required monitoring must be submitted
at least every six months and that “[a]ll instances of deviations from
permit requirements must be clearly identified.”66 The Sierra Club
contended that the regulation required the facilities to submit the
results of all required monitoring and argued that without access to all
the monitoring data, the public would not be able to detect unreported
incidents of noncompliance. The EPA interpreted the regulation only to
59. Id. at 1277.
60. Id. at 1278.
61. Id. at 1279.
62. Id. at 1278-79.
63. Id. at 1279.
64. In addition to the King Finishing permit, the Sierra Club challenged the EPA’s
refusal to object to permits issued to a facility owned by Monroe Power and two facilities
owned by Shaw Industries. Id. at 1280.
65. Id. at 1283.
66. 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(3)(iii)(A) (2007); Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1281.
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require the submission of data showing noncompliance with the
permit.67
The court stated that it was obliged to defer to the EPA’s “ ‘reasonable
interpretation of its own regulations’”68 and that “[w]hen an agency has
interpreted one of its regulations in a consistent manner, that interpre-
tation is ‘controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.’”69 The court noted that the EPA had issued a previous
permit with the same requirement (that is, that the facility report only
incidents of noncompliance and not all monitoring data), which the court
considered to be a consistent interpretation of the reporting requirement
and not erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.70 The court thus
held that the EPA did not abuse its discretion in failing to object to the
four permits on this ground.71
With regard to the Sierra Club’s complaint, the court similary held
that the EPA should have objected to the same four permits because the
EPD did not require the facilities to submit and make available
information for public review (during the comment period for the
permits) that the EPD itself did not consider as part of the permitting
process, including monitoring data and risk management plans.72 The
regulation at issue requires the EPD to make available to the public
during the comment period all “supporting materials” to the application
and all materials “relevant to the permit decision.”73 The Sierra Club
argued that this regulation requires the permitting authority to make
available all information relevant to the permit application, regardless
of whether the authority actually considers and uses the information.74
The EPA interpreted the phrase “relevant to the permit decision” more
narrowly to mean only the “information that the permitting authority
has deemed to be relevant.”75 Otherwise, the EPA argued, the phrase
would have no boundaries at all.76
Again, the court noted that it was obliged to defer to the agency’s
reasonable interpretation of its own regulation, and because the
regulation itself “does not detail what materials are ‘relevant to the
67. Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1281.
68. Id. at 1282 (quoting U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir. Office of Workers’ Comp.
Programs, 386 F.3d 977, 985 (11th Cir. 2004)).
69. Id. (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1283.
72. Id. at 1283-84.
73. 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(h)(2); Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1283-84.
74. Sierra Club, 436 F.3d at 1284.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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permitting decision’ and does not specify who gets to decide,” the EPA
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to object to EPD’s issuance of the
four permits on that basis.77 The court’s holding in the second appeal
highlights the limitations on the public’s ability to scrutinize both
regulated facilities and the regulating agency in the administration of
Title V permits. While the holding is sound, based on the court’s own
limitations in reviewing agency interpretations of its rules, the rules
themselves are ambiguous, and on both points the agency chose to
interpret those rules to require that less information be made available
to the public rather than more.
In Sierra Club v. Georgia Power Co.,78 the Eleventh Circuit held that
the “startup, shutdown, or malfunction” (“SSM”) rule in Georgia’s Clean
Air Act State Implementation Plan (“SIP”), which allows a facility to
emit pollutants in excess of its Title V permit limits during those three
circumstances, was not eliminated by a subsequent EPA guidance policy
for two reasons: first, the EPA later clarified the guidance policy to
explain that the policy was not intended to alter existing provisions of
an EPA-approved SIP, and second, even if the policy were so construed,
it was not a formal rule and thus could not supersede an SIP provi-
sion.79 The court also held that the SSM rule as incorporated into the
defendant’s Title V permit was not altered by changes in the language
of the rule as it appeared in the permit.80
The Sierra Club filed suit against Georgia Power, contending that on
approximately 4,000 occasions between 1998 and 2002, two operating
units at Georgia Power’s Plant Wansley exceeded the opacity limit in its
Title V operating permit.81 Georgia Power did not dispute the exceed-
ances, but contended that the exceedances were not permit violations
because they all occurred within periods of startup, shutdown, or
malfunction, during which times both its permit and the SSM rule in the
Georgia SIP allowed such exceedances.82 The Sierra Club contended
77. Id.
78. 443 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2006).
79. Id. at 1353-54.
80. Id. at 1355-56.
81. Id. at 1350. The court explained that opacity is a measure of the amount of light
that passes through stack emissions at a facility. Id. at 1350 n.4. Opacity is a surrogate
measurement for particulate matter in emissions. Id.
82. Id. at 1350. The SSM rule in the Georgia SIP provides that:
[e]xcess emissions resulting from startup, shutdown, malfunction of any source
which occur though ordinary diligence is employed shall be allowed provided that
(I) the best operational practices to minimize emissions were adhered to, and (II)
all associated air pollution control equipment is operated in a manner consistent
with good air pollution control practice for minimizing emissions and (III) the
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that Georgia Power did not have an affirmative defense based on the
SSM exemption for two reasons: first, the SSM rule, which had been
part of Georgia’s SIP since 1980, had been superseded by an EPA
guidance policy issued in 1999, which greatly narrowed the scope of the
defense, and second, the rule in the form it had been incorporated into
the Plant Wansley permit precluded Georgia Power from raising the
defense.83
The court rejected the Sierra Club’s first contention on two grounds.
First, the court held that the EPA’s 1999 Guidance policy was intended
only to apply prospectively to SIPs being considered for approval by the
EPA and not to SIPs that had been approved prior to the Guidance.84
The court noted that the EPA recognized this prospective application in
a clarification to the Guidance it issued in 2001, in which the EPA
stated that the “[1999] Guidance was not intended to alter the status of
any existing [SSM] provision in a SIP that has been approved by the
EPA.”85 Second, the court held that even if the EPA had intended the
1999 Guidance policy to apply retrospectively to SIPs approved prior to
1999, it could not have done so except by requiring a formal revision of
Georgia’s SIP pursuant to the CAA.86 The court stated that the “EPA
policy guidance cannot trump the SSM rule adopted by Georgia and
approved formally by the EPA.”87 Thus, the EPA’s 1999 Guidance
policy did not affect the SSM rule in the Georgia SIP.
The court also rejected the Sierra Club’s second contention that the
rule, due to slightly altered language that was incorporated into the
facility’s permit, precluded Georgia Power from raising the SSM defense
in the case.88 In the permit itself, the language from the rule was
prefaced with an introductory statement that read, “ ‘the [Georgia
Environmental Protection] Division may allow’ SSM exceedances” under
the conditions set out in the rule.89 The Sierra Club argued first that
this language limited the SSM defense to agency enforcement actions
and thus rendered it unavailable to Georgia Power in a citizen suit and
second that the language made the entire rule merely an acknowledg-
duration of excess emissions is minimized.
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-3-1-.02(2)(a)(7)(i).
83. Georgia Power, 443 F.3d at 1350, 1354-55.
84. Id. at 1354.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1355 n.13.
89. Id.
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ment of the EPD’s enforcement discretion and not a rule on which
Georgia Power could rely.90
The court held that the permit merely restated the rule and did not
alter it by the addition of the introductory clause.91 The court noted
that the purpose of an operating permit is to “merely consolidate . . . in
a single document all of the clean air requirements already applicable
to that source,” and further noted that the provisions of an SIP remain
binding on regulated facilities regardless of the permit itself.92 Finally,
the court noted that the Sierra Club’s attempt to reduce the SSM rule
to an expression of agency discretion would render the SSM provision
meaningless in the permit.93 Thus, Georgia Power was entitled to use
the SSM rule as a defense.
As a result of these holdings, the court reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the Sierra Club and remanded, allowing
Georgia Power to raise the SSM rule as an affirmative defense to the
permit exceedances.94 The court noted that Georgia Power would still
have to prove that it met the three conditions set out in the rule as to
each of the exceedances.95 The court also noted, with a point that could
also apply to Johnson, that the plaintiff ’s “real complaint is not with
Georgia Power’s permit compliance, but rather with Georgia’s SSM Rule
itself,” for which the remedy (in the present case at least) is a petition
for rulemaking.96
III. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton,97 the Eleventh Circuit,
in an issue of first impression, held that the failure of the Fish and
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) to designate a critical habitat for a threatened
species as required under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)98 was
not a continuing violation that would allow an extension of the six-year
limitation period for bringing suit.99
The FWS proposed to designate two species of minnows as threatened
species in 1991. The final rule confirming the listing was issued in 1992.
90. Id. at 1355-56.
91. Id. at 1356.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1357.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006). The defendant was the regional director of Region
4 of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
99. Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335.
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Under the ESA, the FWS was required to act on the proposal within a
year. The agency was required to designate the critical habitat of the
species and issue a final rule designating the species as threatened.
However, if agency found that the critical habitat of the species was
undeterminable, then the agency would have an additional year to
determine the critical habitat. In this case, the FWS determined that
the habitat was undeterminable. Thus, the FWS was required to
designate the critical habitat by 1993, two years after the proposed rule
designating the species as threatened was issued. The agency failed to
do so. However, the Center for Biological Diversity (“Center”) did not
file suit to force the FWS to designate the critical habitat until 2004.
The district court held that the suit was untimely and dismissed.100
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.101 The court first noted that the
ESA’s citizen suit provision contained no limitation period; thus, the
general six-year limitation period for suits against the United States
applied in the case, and the period had clearly lasped.102 But the
Center argued that the agency’s failure to designate the critical habitat
for the minnows was a continuing violation of its nondiscretionary duty
under the ESA, which in effect extended the limitation period indefinite-
ly.103 The court rejected this argument104 and concluded that the
ESA’s language requiring the critical habitat designation to be made
“‘not later than’” two years after the proposed listing was published
“create[d] not an ongoing duty but a fixed point in time at which the
violation for the failure of the [agency] to act arises.”105 The court also
determined that this interpretation was consistent with its own
precedent, noting that its holdings regarding the continuing violation
doctrine was distinguishable from the continuing consequences of a one-
time violation, which do not extend the limitation period, and the
continuation of the violation itself, which does.106 Finally, the court
pointed out that it has limited the application of the continuing violation
doctrine to cases in which a “reasonably prudent plaintiff would have
been unable to determine that a violation had occurred.”107 The court
concluded that because a reasonably prudent plaintiff in this case would
have been able to determine that the agency had not designated the
100. Id. at 1333.
101. Id. at 1336.
102. Id. at 1334-35. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).
103. Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1334-35.
104. Id. at 1335.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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critical habitat as soon as the deadline for doing so expired, the Center
could not take advantage of the doctrine.108 In closing, the court
emphasized that its holding did not foreclose relief for the Center
because the Center could still petition the agency to designate the
critical habitat.109
IV. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT/CLEAN WATER ACT
In Sierra Club v. Flowers,110 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of environmental plaintiffs
and against the Corps of Engineers (“Corps”), the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (“FWS”), and several private mining companies in the
plaintiffs’ National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)111 and Clean
Water Act (“CWA”)112 challenges to the Corps’s issuance and extension
of “dredge and fill”113 permits allowing limestone mining on approxi-
mately 5,400 acres of wetlands in Dade County, Florida.114
The court held that the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”)
prepared by the Corps and the FWS was legally insufficient for five
reasons:
1) the information contained in the EIS . . . was inaccurate, incomplete,
and unclear; 2) the analysis of alternatives was insufficiently rigorous
and therefore misleading; 3) methods for protecting the municipal
water supply were neither identified nor established; 4) seepage
impacts were not studied sufficiently nor mitigated for; and 5) the
[EIS] failed to report, or even account for, the foreseeable loss of wood
stork habitat.115
The court also held that the Corps should have prepared a supplemental
EIS to account for changes in the permit conditions after the EIS was
issued.116 Finally, the court held that the Corps violated the CWA by
(1) failing to consider practicable alternatives to mining in the wet-
lands;117 (2) concluding that mining would not be contrary to the public
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1336.
110. 423 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 4321–4370d (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1251–1387 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
113. Under § 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000 & Supp. III 2003),
activities that will result in placing dredged or fill material into a water of the United
States, including a wetland, require a permit from the Corps of Engineers.
114. Flowers, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 1279-80.
115. Id. at 1380.
116. Id. at 1349.
117. Id. at 1363-64.
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interest based on an inadequate record;118 (3) failing to provide
adequate plans to minimize adverse impacts of the mining;119 and (4)
failing to provide adequate public hearings regarding the permits.120
The area of northwestern Dade County, Florida, in which the mining
activities were proposed is a ninety-square-mile area of wetlands lying
between the urban coast and the Everglades National Park. The area
serves as both a buffer between the developed areas of the coast and the
Park and as a source of drinking water for Miami.121 Limestone
mining, a highly destructive activity that fundamentally alters the
character of wetlands in which it occurs,122 has occurred in the contest-
ed area since the 1950s,123 and the limestone excavated from this area
is of high quality and is valuable.124
In 1991 mining companies began discussing with the Corps and
coordinating with state and local agencies to permit mining operations
in the area. In 1992 the Corps began developing an EIS125 that would
address mining in a 54,000-acre area to include the wetlands in
question. A preliminary draft of the EIS was completed in 1997, at
which point mining companies began submitting permit applications.
The Corps issued the final EIS in 2000 together with a notice of intent
to issue permits for fifty years of mining, which was later reduced to ten
years. The EIS concluded that there were no practicable or less-
damaging alternatives that would satisfy the project’s purpose.126
In short, NEPA requires an agency producing an EIS about a proposed
federal action to identify (1) the environmental impact of the action; (2)
adverse environmental impacts that cannot be avoided; (3) alternatives
to the action (including the alternative of no action, that is, not issuing
a permit); (4) the relationship between short-term uses of the environ-
ment and the enhancement of long-term productivity; and (5) any
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources caused by the
action.127 Additionally, as to permit issuance, the CWA and its
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1365.
120. Id. at 1366-67.
121. Id. at 1292-94.
122. Id. at 1298-99.
123. Id. at 1294.
124. Id. at 1296-97.
125. NEPA requires an agency to prepare an EIS for any “ ‘major Federal action[]
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.’ ” See Flowers, 423 F. Supp.
2d at 1308 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)). Permit issuance constitutes a major federal
action. See id.
126. Id. at 1304-07.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c); Flowers, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-10.
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regulations require that a permit not be issued if a preferable and
practicable alternative exists, or if the permitted activity would cause or
contribute to a significant degradation of the waters at issue (here,
wetlands), or if the permit does not require that potential adverse
impacts be minimized through appropriate and practical steps.128 The
CWA also requires public participation in the permitting process.129
The court, in an extensive analysis, noted numerous areas in which
the Corps’s EIS failed to meet these standards.130 In its introduction,
the court noted that the EIS in this case was conducted against the
backdrop of a takings case that resulted in a large award, and even
larger settlement, in favor of one of the mining companies seeking
permits.131 The court speculated that due to the state legislature’s
clear support for the mining industry and the prospect of more expensive
litigation that would undoubtedly result from permit denials, “there
[was] an underlying theme of pre-determination” in the EIS process that
resulted in procedural and substantive shortcuts, that the Corps
appeared to be serving more as a negotiator with the mining industry
applicants than as a regulator charged with enforcing environmental
laws, and that the Corps’s perceived duty to safeguard the rights of
property owners to use their property “overwhelmed significant
environmental factors regarding the adverse impact” that mining in the
area would have.132
128. Flowers, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
129. Id.
130. The opinion, including footnotes, is 103 pages long in the Federal Supplement.
This summary omits an in-depth analysis of the court’s reasoning.
131. Id. at 1291. The EIS proceeded against the backdrop of a takings case brought
by Florida Rock Industries in the early 1980s. Id. The Corps had denied Florida Rock’s
application for a permit to mine on ninety-eight acres of wetlands. Florida Rock won its
case initially in the Federal Court of Claims, and its claim survived several appeals and
remands. Its initial award in the claims court was $1,029,000. Florida Rock expanded its
claim to the entire 1,560 wetland acres it owned in the area and was awarded $10.5
million. Florida Rock eventually settled the case in 2001 for $21 million. The court in
Flowers noted that the settlement amount bore no relation to the award. See id. at 1300-
02. See also Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985) and its subsequent
history.
132. Flowers, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 1287, 1291.
